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Consumer Credit-COMPUTATION OF REVOLVING CREDIT FINANCE
CHARGES-DEATH AND REBIRTH OF THE PREVIOUS BALANCE METHOD IN
NEw YORK
Zachary v. R.H. Macy & Co., 31 N.Y.2d 443,
293 N.E.2d 80, 340 N.Y.S.2d 908 (1972)
The three methods most frequently used to calculate finance
charges on revolving credit are the previous balance method, the ad-
justed balance method, and the average daily balance method. Under
the previous balance method, the periodic finance charge rate is applied
to the balance at the beginning of the billing cycle, and the finance
charge is computed without first deducting payments made during the
cycle.: This practice has drawn considerable criticism from consumers,
legislators, and commentators,2 but creditors resist change since the pre-
1 Under the previous balance method, the finance charge (typically 1.5%) is computed
on the basis of the balance at the beginning of the billing cycle (typically 30 days) without
first deducting partial payments made during the current cycle. For example, if a con-
sumer makes a $100 purchase at the beginning of the cycle and pays $50 on account during
the cycle, the finance charge will be $1.50 (1.5% X $100). Generally, no finance charge is
assessed if the entire bill is paid during the billing cycle, a result mandated by common
sense on the part of the creditors, not by mathematical necessity.
The adjusted balance method deducts partial payments from the balance at the be-
ginning of the cycle before computing the finance charge. Thus, using the above figures,
the finance charge would be $.75 (1.5% X $50). The $50 figure represents the initial bal-
ance ($100) minus the payments during the cycle ($50).
The average daily balance method takes the average balance owed during the cycle as
the basis for the finance charge. Suppose the consumer made his $50 payment at the end
of 20 days in a 30-day cycle. There would be an outstanding unpaid balance of $100 for
20 days and a balance of $50 for 10 days. The average daily balance would be computed as
follows:
(20 days X $100) + (10 days X $50) $83.34
30 days
The finance charge would then be $1.25 (1.5% X $83.34).
Other less frequently employed methods include the dosing balance method and the
past-due balance method. Under the closing balance method, the finance charge is com-
puted by deducting partial payments made during the billing cycle (as in the adjusted
balance method) and adding all purchases made during the cycle to the balance. The past-
due balance method allows a consumer to pay his bill in full every other month without
incurring any finance charge. See generally Zachary v. R.H. Macy 8. Co., 31 N.Y.2d 443, 293
N.E.2d 80, 340 N.Y.S.2d 908 (1972); FTC Consumer Policy Statement No. 4 (May 7, 1970),
reprinted in 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUmE 30,369 1970: Hearings on S. 5 Before the
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th
Cong. 1st Sess., 199-223 (1967) (testimony of W. Batten, Chairman of the Board, J.C. Penney
Co.); Brandel, Open End Credit Disclosure, 26 Bus. l~Aw. 815 (1971).
Quite obviously, the choice of a particular method can make a significant difference in
the ultimate amount billed to a consumer as a finance charge.
2 See Seibert v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., summarized in 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDir GUIDE
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vious balance method is highly favorable to them. This method gen-
erally yields the highest finance charge possible under the various
methods3 and is simpler to administer than the others.4 It has very real
disadvantages, however, especially for the low income consumer. Ad-
vocates of consumer legislation have observed that there is a large mar-
ket for consumer credit among persons near, or even below, the poverty
level6 The poor frequently turn to the use of consumer credit as their
one hope of realizing some semblance of the American dream,6 but the
previous balance method works to their financial detriment.
Low income consumers, in particular, need to be able to shop
for credit terms. Consequently, they should be made fully aware of
the various methods of computing revolving credit finance charges.7
The federal truth-in-lending disclosure requirements for annual per-
centage rates (APR) are merely nominal. The regulations permit a
retailer to calculate the APR by multiplying the periodic rate by the
number of periods in a year." The nominal APR for all methods (e.g.,
1.5 percent per month X 12 months = 18 percent per year) will be
identical. However, the effective APR under the previous balance
method will generally be higher than that obtained under other meth-
ods because the balance to which the periodic rate is applied will usu-
ally be largerY For substantial purchases, the difference in the effective
cost of credit can become tremendous over a period of months. Critics
have noted that
most consumers will focus their attention on the APR figure,
which under both [the previous balance and the adjusted balance
99,164 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 1, 1972); Johnson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 4 CCH CONSUMIER
CREDIT GuiDE 99,289 (IIl. Cir. Ct. 1971); Brown v. Marcor, Inc., 4 CCH CONSUMER CsrmT
GumE 99,288 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1971); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Kelley, Civil No. 12,211, C.
(Mich. Cir. Ct., Ingham County, Sept. 22, 1971); Zachary v. R.H. Macy & Co., 31 N.Y.2d
443, 293 N.E.2d 80, 340 N.YS.2d 908 (1972); 118 CoNG. REc. S 6902 (daily ed. April 27, 1972)
(statement of Senator Proxmire); Brandel, supra note 1.
B The closing balance method can yield a higher return to creditors if the amount
purchased during the billing cycle is greater than the partial payments, but this method is
not widely utilized. See note 1 supra.
4 See note 1 supra.
5 See, e.g., Caplovitz, Consumer Credit in the Affluent Society, 33 LAW & CoNT-mp.
PROB. 641, 647 (1968).
6 Id.
7 See FTC Consumer Policy Statement No. 4 (May 7, 1970), reprinted in 4 CCH CON-
suMER Cemrr GUoDE 30,369 1970.
8 Regulations permit this method of calculation in the initial statement when an
account is opened (12 C.F.R. § 226.7(a)(4) (1972), and in the periodic statements. Id.
§§ 226.5(a)(1), .7(b)(6).
9 See note 1 supra.
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methods] will be identical, and will not have the sophistication to
realize that one of those plans provides a lower interest rate than
the other.'0
Even with the information needed to shop for credit, the low-
income consumer may not be able to avoid making purchases subject to
previous balance finance charges, due to an often limited access to shop-
ping facilities.:" If the accessible retailers all use the previous balance
method, complete finance charge information is of little practical signifi-
cance.
An outspoken opponent of the previous balance method, Senator
William Proxmire, contends that this method encourages low income
consumers to overextend themselves financially.12 The Senator claims
that the failure to reduce finance charges commensurate with partial
payments made during the billing cycle decreases a consumer's incen-
tive to reduce his indebtedness. 13 Another of the Senator's criticisms
concerns the effect of the previous balance method on a consumer with
a billing dispute. If a customer elects to pay his entire indebtedness
during the billing cycle, there will be no finance charge levied for that
month. If, however, even a small amount is withheld by the consumer
because of a billing error or dispute, the retailer will assess a finance
charge on the whole balance as of the beginning of that cycle. Thus, the
previous balance method pressures consumers to pay charges which they
may not owe, in order to avoid finance charges. 14 Proxmire estimates
that the previous balance method costs the American consumer 200
million a year.'5
10 Brandel, supra note 1, at 819.
11 See Johnson, The New Law of Finance Charges: Disclosure, Freedom of Entry, and
Rate Ceilings, 33 LAw & CoNtEMp. PROB. 671, 676-77 (1968).
12 118 CONG. RiEc. S 6883, 6902-03 (daily ed. April 27, 1972) (statement of Senator Prox-
mire).
13 Id. Under the previous balance method there is no advantage to paying off part of
the principal since the interest will still be computed on the entire amount due at the begin-
ning of the month. Therefore, a knowledgeable and able consumer will pay the principal
due under the previous balance method on the last possible day, thus, effectively retaining
control over the money for the entire month free of finance charges.
Although partial payments made during one billing cycle will not reduce the finance
charge in the periodic statement sent out at the end of that cycle, they will reduce the
finance charge in the following month's statement. To reduce the finance charge assessed
next month, there is at least some incentive to make current partial payments.
14 Id. at S 6885. Under the adjusted balance method, the same statement would only
contain a finance charge on the small unpaid amount. See note 1 supra. If the consumer
were ultimately successful in his contention that he did not owe the disputed amount,
he probably would not have to pay any finance charge.
15 Id.
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I
THE CONTEXT OF THE CONTROVERSY
Allegations have been made that the previous balance method is
not only unfair, but that it is also illegal under existing state retail in-
stallment sales acts. During the last three years, these contentions have
resulted in official challenges to the method. In 1970, Michigan Attorney
General Frank J. Kelley issued a formal opinion16 in which he declared
the previous balance method violative of the Michigan retail install-
ment sales act.17 Shortly thereafter, the Attorney General initiated suit
against three large retailers to enjoin the practice.18 In September 1970,
the Circuit Court of Ingham County, Michigan, determined in Mont-
gomery Ward & Co. v. Kelley 9 that the words "computed on all amounts
unpaid" in the statute meant computed on the balance after payments
made during the billing cycle had been deducted. Pursuant to this
determination, a settlement was reached whereby the three retailers,
together with two others, abandoned the previous balance method and
switched to the average daily balance method.20
Unfortunately, such victories over the practice are the exception
and not the rule. In several states with statutes similar to that of Mich-
igan, the judiciary has reached conclusions favoring the retailer. In
1971, the Illinois Circuit Court of Cook County held that the Illinois
16 [1969-1970] MICH. ATT'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 163.
17 MicH. STAT. ANN. § 19A16(112) (Supp. 1972). The statute provides in pertinent part:
A retail charge agreement may provide for, and the seller or holder may then,
notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, charge, collect and receive a time
price differential for the privilege of paying in installments thereunder, in an
amount not exceeding 1.7% of the unpaid balance per month. The time price
differential under this subsection shall be computed on all amounts unpaid there-
under from month to month, which need not be calendar months ....
Id.
18 Office of the Michigan Attorney General, Press Release (Sept. 22, 1971), reprinted in
4 CCH CONSUMER CnRErr GuDE 99,357 1971.
19 Civil No. 12,211, C. (Mich. Cir. Ct., Ingham County, Sept. 22, 1971), cited in Zachary
v. R.H. Macy & Co., 31 N.Y.2d 443, 460 n.6, 293 N.E.2d 80, 89 n.6, 340, N.Y.S.2d 908, 921 n.6
(1972).
20 Office of the Michigan Attorney General, Press Release, supra note 18.
In other jurisdictions, retailers employing the previous balance method have recently
felt similar official pressures. In March 1972, New York Attorney General Louis J. Lef-
kowitz singled out W. & J. Sloane & Co., because "we have to start someplace." N.Y. Times,
March 13, 1972, at 70, col. 3. Shortly thereafter, he brought actions against Macy's and
Gimbels. Id., March 22, 1972, at 51, col. 7.
J.C. Penney Co., has voluntarily changed to the adjusted balance method. Hear-
ings, supra note 1, at 201 (testimony of W. Batten, Chairman of the Board, J.C. Penney Co.).
Sears, Roebuck & Co. switched to the average daily balance method in 32 states and the
District of Columbia because of criticism it had received on its use of the previous balance
method. N.Y. Times, July 8, 1972, at 31, col. 1.
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retail installment sales act2l governed revolving charge accounts and
construed the statute's phrase "computed on all amounts unpaid from
month to month" to permit retailers to use the previous balance
method. 22
A challenge to the California law was similarly resolved. In May
1972, the Alameda County Superior Court of California held that
the words "computed on the outstanding balances from month to
month" in the California retail installment sales law23 did not preclude
use of the previous balance method.2 4 Because the legislative history of
the statute did not reveal an intention to prohibit the method, and
since the statute specifically required disclosure of the method of finance
charge calculation, the court inferred that alternative methods were
permissible.5 Although it conceded that the adjusted balance method
would be more advantageous to the consumer, the court stated that it
was the responsibility of the legislature, not the judiciary, to change
the law.2 6
II
THE Zachary CASE
During 1971 five New York consumers instituted lawsuits against
most of the large, well-established department stores in New York.27
21 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 Y, § 528 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972). The rate ceilings are
specified as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other statute, a retail charge agree-
ment may provide for, and the seller or holder may, if the agreement does so pro-
vide, charge, collect and receive, a finance charge not exceeding 180 per $10 per
month, computed on all amounts unpaid thereunder from month to month, which
need not be a calendar month.
Id.
22 Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 CCH CONsUMER CREDrr GumE 99,289 (Ill. Cir.
Ct. 1971); Brown v. Marcor, Inc., 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GumE 99,288 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
1971).
23 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1810.2 (West Supp. 1972). The statute provides:
Subject to the other provisions of this article the seller or holder of a retail install-
ment account may charge, receive and collect the finance charge authorized by
this chapter. The finance charge shall not exceed the following rates computed on
the outstanding balances from month to month:
(a) On so much of the outstanding balance as does not exceed one thousand
dollars ($1,000), 1 percent.
(b) If the outstanding balance is more than one thousand dollars ($1,000),
1 percent on the excess over one thousand dollars ($1,000) of the outstanding
balance.
Id.
24 Seibert v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., summarized in 4 CCH CONSUMER CaRDrr GumE
99,164 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 1, 1972).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Actions were brought against R.H. Macy & Co., Federated Department Stores, Inc.,
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Plaintiffs brought individual and class actions in the Supreme Court
for New York County alleging that use of the previous balance method
violated section 413(3) of the New York Personal Property Law.28 The
relevant provision states:
A seller may, in a retail installment credit agreement, contract for
and, if so contracted for, the seller or holder thereof may charge,
receive and collect the service charge authorized by this article. The
service charge shall not exceed the following rates computed.., on
the outstanding indebtedness from month to month:
(a) On so much of the outstanding indebtedness as does not exceed
five hundred dollars, one and one-half per centum per month;
(b) If the outstanding indebtedness is more than five hundred dol-
lars, one per centum per month on the excess over five hundred
dollars of the outstanding indebtedness ....
Pursuant to section 414 of the Personal Property Law,80 the plaintiffs
Spartans Industries, Inc., and Gimbel Brothers, Inc. See Zachary v. R.H. Macy & Co., 31
N.Y.2d 443, 293 N.E.2d 80, 340 N.Y.S.2d 908 (1972).
28 N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 413(3) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
29 Id. The statute became effective in 1957, ch. 599, § 1 [1957] N.Y. Laws 1361, and
was the first of its kind to deal with revolving credit. See Statement of Governor Harriman
on approving chs. 594-99, [1957] N.Y. Laws 1349-75, reprinted in 1957 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1861
(McKinney). The New York statute was probably the model for the Michigan, Illinois, and
California statutes. See notes 17, 21, & 23 and accompanying text supra. Neither the state-
ment of the Governor, nor the Memorandum of the Consumer Council to the Governor,
1957 N.Y. Sess. Laws 2113 (McKinney), provides any insight into which method of com-
puting service charges was intended by the statute. These documents do indicate, however,
that § 413(3) of the Personal Property Law was designed to benefit the consumer. See note
53 and accompanying text infra.
New York Attorney General Lefkowitz and the Department of Law have undertaken an
evaluation of the legislative history of § 413(3) of the Personal Property Law in order
to determine the propriety of using the previous balance method. As Lefkowitz stated:
[]he Department concluded that it was the intention of the Legislature to pro-
hibit the previous balance method.
Both the wording and the legislative history of Personal Property Law sec-
tion 413, subd. 3 require the creditor to compute the service charge on the actual
unpaid outstanding indebtedness, giving the purchaser an allowance for payments
made during the billing period.
Memorandum of the New York Attorney General on (1972) Sen. Int. No. 7237-B (Mr. La-
verne), (1972) Assy. Int. No. 8254-A (Mr. Field) (March 2, 1972).
On the other hand, the New York Court of Appeals stated:
[The previous balance method] was the method most commonly used by retailers
.. offering revolving credit at the time of the enactment of the Retail Instalment
Sales Act; and a review of the legislative history of that act discloses no intention
to foreclose its continued use, though the legislature must be presumed to have
been aware of the practice ....
Zachary v. R.H. Macy & Co., 31 N.Y.2d 443, 460, 293 N.E.2d 80, 89, 340 N.Y.S.2d 908, 920-21
(1972).
80 N.Y. PERs. PRop. LAw § 414(2) (McKinney 1962) provides:
In case of failure by any person to comply with the provisions of this article, the
buyer shall have the right to recover from such person an amount equal to the
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demanded recovery of an amount equal to the total finance charges
they had paid, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. In Zachary
v. R.H. Macy & Co.,31 the supreme court granted the defendants' mo-
tion to dismiss, reasoning that the legislature had acquiesced in the use
of the previous balance method by consistently rejecting numerous bills
specifically intended to outlaw the method.82
The appellate division reversed,8 3 granting the plaintiffs' cross mo-
tion for summary judgment on the representative causes of action for
declaratory and injunctive relief. The majority stated that when a stat-
ute was "unambiguous," it was immaterial that many retailers contin-
ued to use a method which violated the statute and that the legislature
had declined to clarify or modify the statute.34 The court held that the
plain meaning of the words "outstanding indebtedness from month to
credit service charge or service charge imposed and the amount of any delinquency,
collection, extension, deferral or refinance charge imposed.
31 66 Misc. 2d 974, 323 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
32 Id. at 979-80, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 762-63.
Defendant's method of computing finance charges on revolving charge accounts
has been employed by retailers and others to the extent of millions of statements
monthly, both before and after the enactment in 1957 of the New York Personal
Property Law provisions. It has been used with the full acquiescence of the New
York State Legislature. Since 1957, bills have been introduced time after time to
amend subdivision 3 of section 413 so as to invalidate the previous balance method
of computing finance charges employed by defendant, but these efforts have been
rejected consistently .... This legislative intention is supported by the history of
the enactment and repeal of the New York Truth-in-Lending Act . . .and that
of the Federal Truth-in-Lending Act ....
Id.
A contrary viewpoint was expressed in Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d
427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969). There the court asked:
Are we to hold that a majority of a legislative committee, who give no reason for
their failure to allow the whole body to vote on a measure, impart a legislative
judgment which must be transmuted into a conclusive legislative intent? "The
practicalities of the legislative process furnish many reasons for the lack of suc-
cess of a measure other than legislative dislike for the principle involved in
the legislation. Legislative inaction is a weak reed upon which to lean in deter-
mining legislative intent."
Id. at 433, 248 N.E.2d at 874, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 28, quoting Berry v. Branner, 245 Ore. 307,
311, 421 P.2d 996, 998 (1966); see Dana, Background Materials for Statutory Interpretation
in New York, 14 RecoRD oF N.Y.C.B.A. 80, 99-100 (1959).
Concerning judicial treatment of legislative inaction, Professor John MacDonald, Chair-
man of the New York State Law Revision Commission, has stated:
[W]hen the courts do proceed notwithstanding the fact that the Legislature has
refused to enact the rule they are about to announce judicially, they do not very
often refer to the bill which failed. I believe that when they do refer to the bill
which failed, and treat the non-enactment as indicating legislative policy, they do
it to buttress a conclusion which they have already reached.
Willard & MacDonald, The Effect of an Unsuccessful Attempt To Amend a Statute, 44 COR-
NELL L. Q. 336, 352 (1959) letter from Professor MacDonald to C. Willard.
33 Zachary v. R.H. Macy 9- Co., 39 App. Div. 2d 116, 332 N.Y.S.2d 425 (Ist Dep't 1972).
34 Id. at 120, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 430.
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month" meant only those portions of the purchase price not paid dur-
ing the billing cycle.35 Thus, according to the majority's reasoning, the
use of the previous balance method violated the statute.
Echoing the supreme court's remarks concerning the legislative
failure to counteract the widespread use of the previous balance method,
the New York Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the appellate
division and reinstated the decision of the trial court.38 Writing for
the majority, Judge Scileppi conceded that there was something "dis-
tinctly artificial" about a method which computes finance charges on
the basis of an amount other than that currently due and owing.37
Moreover, he agreed that "[i]n terms of its overall effect, the previous
balance method from the consumer's vantage, is perhaps the least favor-
able method for computing finance charges." 38 Nevertheless, he asserted
that the method makes sound business sense; the retailer uses the pre-
vious balance for the basis of the finance charge as the quid pro quo
for not including current purchases in the calculation.39 Because this
argument is premised on continued activity in the account, its rationale
clearly favors the retailer. If the consumer chooses not to make further
purchases for several months, the previous balance method can serve
only as a detriment to him.
Citing Seibert v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,40 Judge Scileppi rejected
the appellate division's "plain meaning" rule.41 He reasoned that out-
35 Id. at 119-20, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 429-30.
As used here to qualify the term "indebtedness from month to month," the
word "outstanding" plainly means owing and unpaid; "outstanding indebtedness"
is that amount which a debtor owes "month to month." Indebtedness or a part
thereof which has been paid is not "outstanding." This is clear and, plainly, the
statute was not intended to and does not authorize finance charges at the specified
maximum rate "from month to month" on any indebtedness which has been paid.
The plain meaning of the statute may not be circumvented for the purpose of
approving a convenient method of computing finance charges. Nor should we be
unduly concerned with the arguments of the retail sellers based upon their addi-
tional inconvenience and expense in computing the charges on the basis of an
indebtedness which is "outstanding." The wisdom of the Legislature in enacting
the statute in its particular terms is not to be questioned by the courts.
Id.
36 Zachary v. R.H. Macy & Co., 31 N.Y.2d 443, 461, 293 N.E.2d 80, 90, 340 N.Y.S.2d 908,
922 (1972). The majority made it clear that its holding in Zachary was confined to the
individual claims for relief. The court did not decide whether such actions for declaratory
and injunctive relief were maintainable on a class basis. Id. at 449, 293 N.E.2d at 90, 340
N.Y.S.2d at 922.
37 Id. at 451, 293 N.E.2d at 84, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
38 Id. at 454, 293 N.E.2d at 86, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
39 Id. at 453, 293 N.E.2d at 85, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
40 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GuE 99,164 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 1, 1972).
41 Zachary v. R.H. Macy & Co., 31 N.Y.2d 443, 456, 293 N.E.2d 80, 87, 340 N.Y.S.2d 908,
917-18 (1972).
[T]he battle is one of words and we are provided with no real answer to the
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standing indebtedness can be measured only by reference to a particular
point in time, which may be at the beginning of the billing cycle as
easily as at the end.42 Accordingly, the previous balance method is
simply deferred computation of the finance charge on an "outstanding
indebtedness," "but for other than the current billing cycle." 43 In a
footnote, he observed that if the words "outstanding indebtedness" are
construed to mean "owing and unpaid balance," the adjusted balance
method is no more computed on such a basis than is the previous bal-
ance method, for under the former system purchases made during the
current billing cycle are not added to the balance.44 Given the disparate
rulings in Michigan, Illinois, and California,45 the majority was prob-
ably justified in holding that there is no "plain meaning" to the statute.
The statutory language itself suggests that the draftsmen did not con-
sider the problem or, more likely, deliberately avoided approval or dis-
approval of particular methods.
Judge Scileppi also rejected the contention that in realizing an
effective rate which may exceed the statutory nominal maximum rate
(1.5 percent per month or 1 percent per month),46 the previous balance
method is illegal. He explained that for revolving credit the effective
rate cannot be determined in advance because the time and amount
of payments are under the consumer's exclusive control.47 It is there-
fore the nominal rate which the statute regulates, and not the effec-
tive rate.48 In summary, Judge Scileppi construed the law to permit
problem posed. In suggesting that the statutory requirement may be satisfied by
any charge which is computed on the amount actually owing at some point in time,
here the beginning of a current billing cycle, so long as that computation is applied
at consistent monthly intervals, it, nonetheless, points to the fact that the statute
has no "plain meaning" and that its true import can only be culled from its legis-
lative history including the uses and practices existing at the time of its enact-
ment, as well as the statutory scheme of which it is but a part.
Id.
42 Id. at 455, 293 N.E.2d at 86, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 916-17.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 461 n.7, 293 N.E.2d at 90 n.7, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 921 n.7.
45 See notes 17-26 and accompanying text supra.
46 In an example cited by Senator Proxmire, a consumer makes a purchase for $100
and makes partial payments totalling $90 during the billing period. If the nominal rate is
1.5% per month and the previous balance method is used, the consumer will be assessed a
finance charge of $1.50 (1.5% X $100). Since the consumer has only a $10 unpaid balance
at the end of the billing cycle, the finance charge is ten times as much as a finance charge
computed on the adjusted balance method. The effective rate, according to Proxmire, is
15% per month under these facts, or "a whopping 180 percent a year." 118 CONG. REc.
S 6902 (daily ed. April 27, 1972) (statement of Senator Proxmire).
47 Zachary v. R.H. Macy & Co., 31 N.Y.2d 443, 459, 293 N.E.2d 80, 89, 340 N.Y.S.2d 908,
920 (1972).
48 Id. Section 413 of the Personal Property Law is the only provision affecting the rate
structure of revolving credit finance charges. As the court pointed out, in New York the
finance charge on retail credit sales is not treated as interest, and therefore is not governed
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calculation of finance charges on the basis of the amount owed at any
time during the billing cycle, so long as computation is made at con-
sistent monthly intervals.49
Judges Bergan and Jasen dissented, contending that the appellate
division's construction of the words "outstanding indebtedness from
month to month" was "altogether reasonable." 50 Judge Bergan found
it "incredible" that the legislature would have intentionally sanctioned
a practice so adverse to New York consumers. 51 Instead, he argued, the
legislature's intent must be deemed to have been the one most favor-
able to consumers.52 This approach is not without merit if Personal
Property Law section 413 is considered as a provision to protect con-
sumers from excessive finance charges. The legislative history, although
sparse, indicates that the statute was passed for the benefit of the con-
sumer.53 Therefore, it would not have been unreasonable for the court
to have invalidated the previous balance method by giving the statute
a construction favorable to consumers.
Until its reversal, the opinion of the appellate division was the
country's strongest judicial authority for outlawing the previous balance
method in states with statutory provisions similar to that of New York.54
Now, however, the decisional trend is in the opposite direction.55 The
New York Court of Appeals had an opportunity to break new ground
in an area where legislative efforts have been minimal, but it chose not
to do so.56 At least one thing now is certain-if change is to come in this
by the state usury laws. Id. at 457 n.5, 293 N.E.2d at 88 n.5, 340 N.Y.S.2d 918 at n.5. Instead,
the finance charge is viewed as "a 'time price differential' designed to compensate sellers for
additional risks and losses of interest which would ordinarily accrue had he [sic] received
immediate payment." Id.
49 Id. at 461, 293 N.E.2d at 90, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
50 Id. at 462, 293 N.E.2d at 91, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 922 (Bergan, J., dissenting).
51 Id. at 463, 293 N.E.2d at 91, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 923.
52 Id.
53 On approving the legislation which governs revolving credit finance charges, Gov-
ernor Harriman remarked that "[t]hese six bills relating to the regulation and supervision
of instalment sales mark one of the greatest advances in the history of the State in the
field of consumer protection." Statement of Governor Harriman, supra note 29, at 1861.
The Consumer Council to the Governor underscored the importance of this law, saying:
"For the first time in this, or any other state, the law now gives protection to the buyer
of goods and related services under any instalment sales plan." Memorandum of the Con-
sumer Council to the Governor, supra note 29, at 2113.
54 N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 413(3) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
55 See notes 21-26 and accompanying text supra. Zachary, of course, adds considerable
weight to the list of authorities upholding the previous balance method.
56 The administrative problems that might have arisen following an affirmance of
the appellate division do not seem insurmountable.
Courts and legislatures need not be viewed as antagonists .... Developing the
law is the province of both, and the peculiar attributes of these institutions are
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area of consumer credit law, it must await legislative action 7 or a
fresh judicial challenge. 58
complementary in getting the task performed. Judicial action is often necessary to
bring to the attention of the Legislature a particular problem in order for it to
accomplish the necessary reform which only legislative action can fashion. (foot-
notes omitted)
Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 435, 248 N.E.2d 871, 875-76, 301
N.Y.S.2d 23, 80 (1969).
Until Zachary, Personal Property Law § 413(3) had never been construed by the New
York Court of Appeals, and the legislature had not provided clarification. Presumably the
court was free to develop rules within the limits of the statutory language.
While we still have a long way to go in recognizing the appellate court as an ex-
plicit law creating institution, it is nonetheless true that the lawmaking function
has assumed a far more self-conscious direction in our own day. Courts have been
remaking law with increased frankness and deliberateness and in doing so have
been more sensitive to social implications and social data footnote omitted.
Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L REv. 1, 26 (1960).
Since the previous balance method has attracted considerable public attention in the last
few years, it is arguable that the court is a proper vehicle for legal change, given the
recurring legislative inactivity.
Certainly, if the court had construed the statute to preclude the previous balance
method, problems of reliance and stability for planning purposes would have been raised.
Many New York retailers who have been using the method have relied on the belief that
they were obeying the law. Affirmation of the appellate division opinion would have raised
the spectre of litigating all the "violations" back to 1957, the year in which the statute was
enacted. Nevertheless, these difficulties could have been overcome if the court of appeals
had limited its decision to prospective effects, a practice which Mr. Justice (then Judge)
Cardozo espoused while on the Court of Appeals. Id. See also Currier, Time and Change
in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 U. VA. L. Rev. 201 (1965).
57 At both federal and state levels, legislators have sought to abrogate the use of
the previous balance method. Legislative attempts on the federal level have failed. The
most recent defeat occurred during 1972, when the Senate rejected a proposal by Senator
Proxmire to amend the Federal Truth-in-Lending Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-81 (1970)) to
forbid use of the previous balance method. 118 CONG. Rec. S 6885 (daily ed. April 27, 1972).
On the other hand, several states have enacted such statutes in recent years. Each of
these statutes sanctions particular methods of calculating the finance charge on revolving
credit accounts, conspicuously omitting the previous balance method from the authorized
list. The Massachusetts truth-in-lending act (MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 140c, § 6B (Supp. 1972)),
as well as the Retail Instalment Sales and Services Law (MAss. ANN. LAWs ch. 255D, § 27
(A)(3) (Supp. 1972)), now permit only use of the adjusted balance method and the average
daily balance method. The Wisconsin legislature passed the Wisconsin Consumer Act (Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 422.101-.419 (Spec. Pamphlet 1973)), which became effective on March 1, 1973.
Under that scheme, a creditor may use only the average daily balance method, the adjusted
balance method, or a "range" method whereby the same rate is applied to average daily or
adjusted balances within a certain range. Id. § 422.201(a). As in Massachusetts, the previous
balance method is not authorized. Arizona, Connecticut, Maryland, and the District of
Columbia have passed similar statutes. See Am. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-6003B (1972) (average
daily balance method, adjusted balance method, or a "range" method applied to either of
the two); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-133C (1972) (average daily balance method, or on
"outstanding unpaid balance as of the end of the current biling cycle"); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 83, § 153D(3) (1972) (adjusted balance method, or average daily balance method;
finance charge not to exceed that calculated under the average daily balance method);
D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 28-3702 (1972) (adjusted balance method, average daily balance
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CONCLUSION
The Zachary decision may generate enough dissatisfaction with the
present form of New York Personal Property Law section 413(3) to
prompt legislative action.5 9 New York was a pioneer in regulation of re-
method, or a "range" method applied to either of the two). A chart summarizing the law
of every state on this question is contained in 1 CCH CONSUMER CRnrr GumE 630 (1972).
The Colorado Uniform Consumer Credit Code, ch. 207, no. 73-2-207 [1971] Colo. Laws
786, requires that service charges for revolving credit accounts be computed on an "adjusted
balance." A Colorado UCCC Administrative Interpretation Letter, issued by the Assistant
Attorney General in December 1971, ruled that the section precludes use of the previous
balance method. See 4 CCH CONSUMR CREDr GUIDE 99,244 (1971). The other UCCC states
-Idaho, Indiana, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming-require that the finance charge be com-
puted on the "monthly balance." A summary of the rate structures of these states is con-
tmined in 1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 505 (1972). Uniform Consumer Credit Code
§ 2.201 (Working Redraft No. 4, 1972), now provides alternate provisions--one prescribing
the previous balance method and one proscribing it.
58 Even after Zachary was decided, the New York Times reported that the New York
Attorney General was pressing several similar cases against upstate retailers on the theory
that the previous balance method is "unconscionable" within the meaning of N.Y. U.C.C.
§ 2-302 (McKinney 1964). N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1973, at 64, col. 1. Perhaps this theory will
receive more favorable treatment in the courts.
59 Bills to eliminate the previous balance method have been introduced into the New
York legislature in the past. See, e.g., (1972) Sen. Int. No. 7237-B (Mr. Laverne), (1972) Assy.
Int. No. 8254-A (Mr. Field). This year, Asemblyman Fred G. Field, Chairman of the New
York State Assembly Subcommittee on Consumer Credit, and Senator John R. Dunne have
introduced another such bill, (1973) Sen. Int. No. 1082 (Mr. Dunne), (1973) Assy. Int. No.
1468 (Mr. Field). The bill would amend Personal Property Law § 413(3) by adding the
following paragraph:
If a service charge is imposed, except where the seller or holder uses an average
outstanding indebtedness method, it shall be computed only upon the indebtedness
outstanding at the beginning of the monthly billing period reduced by all pay-
ments and all adjustments and other credits to such outstanding indebtedness
received by the seller or holder during the first twenty-five days of such period.
If a seller or holder uses an average outstanding indebtedness method, in no case
shall purchases made during the current monthly billing period be added to the
indebtedness outstanding at the beginning of the monthly billing period for the
purpose of computing the service charge.
Id. The bill is somewhat closer to the Wisconsin statute than the Massachusetts one in
that the average daily balance method is listed as the first permissible method, without
precisely describing how the average daily balance is to be computed. See note 57 supra.
However, like the Massachusetts scheme, the bill does not expressly authorize the estab-
lishment of "ranges" within which the same finance charge may be imposed. The bill also
provides that only payments made within the first 25 days of the billing cycle need be
considered in using the adjusted balance method.
The bill has the strong support of New York Attorney General Lefkowitz. See N.Y.
Times, Jan. 25, 1973, at 64, col. 4. He has commented that "[t]his bill will end this regres-
sive, anti-consumer provision [Personal Property Law § 413(3)] which, as construed
by the courts, sanctions the use of a method of computing finance charges which is grossly
unfair and in effect requires the consumer to pay finance charges on purchases already
paid for." Memorandum of the New York Attorney General on (1973) Sen. Int. No. 1082
(Mr. Dunne), (1973) Assy. Int. No. 1468 (Mr. Field) (Jan. 3, 1973).
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volving credit; 60 it is appropriate that she resume her place as a leader
in this area.
Jeffrey M. Johnstone
Of the nine consumer protection bills which Governor Rockefeller sent to the legis-
lature in January 1973 and the two additional such bills he plans to send by the end of
the 1973 session, none deals with the problem of the previous balance method. See N.Y.
Times, Jan. 28, 1973, § 1, at 47, col. 1. It is not clear whether the Governor felt that the
previous balance method issue was unimportant, or simply felt that the matter was being
handled satisfactorily by the Attorney General.
60 "This is the first time that 'revolving credit,' which is being used increasingly by
department stores, has been legally identified and brought under public control." State-
ment of Governor Averill Harriman, supra note 29, at 1862.
